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Robert HeilbronerA modern alternative to SparkNotes and CliffsNotes, SuperSummary offers high-quality Study Guides with detailed chapter summaries and analysis of major themes, characters, and more.
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In 1848, the same year that Mill published his magnum opus, a much smaller but equally important pamphlet was published: The Communist Manifesto. Written by Karl Marx and his close friend Friedrich Engels, both members of the Communist League, the manifesto articulated a philosophy of history in which communist revolution was not only desirable but also inevitable.
Although they were close friends, Marx and Engels could not have been more different in their personalities, appearances, or personal histories. Engels, the son of a narrow-minded German manufacturer, went to work at his father’s textile business in Manchester at an early age. He began reading the radical literature of the time, noting how the city’s pleasant façade hid an underworld where workers lived in despair, hopelessness, and brutality. He published his findings, arguing that the great English economists were apologists for the existing order, which attracted the attention of Karl Marx, who was then editing a philosophy magazine in Paris.
Marx came from a mildly radical family of prosperous Jews who later converted to Christianity. Although his father hoped he would study law, Marx found inspiration in the then-controversial ideas of Wilhelm Frederic Hegel, who argued that the Enlightenment’s focus on reason and individualism weren’t the only ways of knowing; humanity should be seen as part of whole, with each individual evolving toward a melding of minds that would create eventual human unity. Marx decided to become a philosopher, but when his favorite professor was fired for his pro-constitutional ideas, Marx’s academic career met an early end. He turned to editing a small newspaper, but his radical editorials caught the attention of the German government—and not in a good way. When the paper was shuttered, Marx moved to Paris and began collaborating with Engels to create a philosophy they called dialectical materialism.
To Marx and Engels, every society was built on an economic base—how it organized productive activity—and that base supported a noneconomic superstructure consisting of the laws, government, religion, and philosophies that bound society together. Marx and Engels came to two conclusions. First, capitalism would eventually destroy itself because the unplanned nature of production would lead to constant economic crises— “by its own inner dynamic, capitalism would produce its own downfall” (147). Second, capitalism would unwittingly produce its own successor because, within the great factories, it was already creating socialism’s rationally planned production schedules while simultaneously producing a trained and disciplined working class. Capitalism’s fall would “in the process, nourish its own enemy” (147).
Marx’s magnum opus, Das Kapital, built on the conclusions of The Communist Manifesto and aimed to discover the capitalist system’s laws of motion. He rigorously described a model of the purest, most perfect capitalism, and then showed why it would inevitably fail: If “the best of all possible capitalisms is nonetheless headed for disaster, it is certainly easy to demonstrate that the real capitalism will follow the same path” (155). Marx’s model posited three tendencies, all of which, to some extent, came to pass: the propensity towards boom/bust economic cycles, monopolies in which massive firms came to dominate business, and proletarianization—the transition from independent worker to employed wage worker—of small artisans and the self-employed.
Marx saw two primary figures in capitalism: the worker, a free agent who enters into the marketplace to sell the only thing he owns—his labor—and the capitalist, an owner-entrepreneur engaged in an endless race for accumulation, not for greed but because if he slows, competition will eliminate him. Capitalists controlled the machines and equipment necessary for work, and workers had no power to ask for more than their labor is worth. “This system is perfectly equitable, and yet all workers are cheated, for they are forced to work a longer time than their own self-sustenance demands” (158).
Marx viewed history as dialectical and, as such, always in motion. Capitalists would always compete with each other and would constantly try to expand their output, thus increasing demand for labor, which would drive up wages and diminish profit. Capitalists would always respond to higher wages by introducing worker-replacing machinery, and unemployment would push wages back down. Because capitalists could only realize profit from surplus labor—labor performed in excess of that needed to sustain workers’ livelihood—when capitalists substitute machinery for labor, they were “killing the goose that lays the golden egg” (159).
Meanwhile, rising unemployment would mean workers could no longer purchase commodities, which would lead to economic crisis. Unemployed workers would then accept wages below their value, larger capitalists would buy up machinery from their smaller competitors, and the cycle would begin anew. Because each crisis would be worse than the preceding one, Marx predicted that capitalism would ultimately collapse under the weight of worsening crises.
As working conditions improved and wages rose, Marx’s revolutionary fervor subsided for a time; for non-Marxist economists, the great Victorian boom filled the world full of hope and promise again. Professional economists of this era no longer doubted the market system’s basic merits or its survival. They focused on smaller, specific topics, examining the workings of the system in great detail. In opposition to these economists and to Victorian intolerance of arguments that capitalism needed major reform, an underworld developed for those who wanted to study human behavior in relation to the economy.
Francis Edgeworth, working to translate economic laws into mathematical form, published Mathematical Physics in 1881. Such a characterization required simplistic assumptions: All people were pleasure seekers that constantly arranged their lives to maximize personal happiness, and in a world of perfect competition, each person would seek the highest amount of pleasure possible, creating market equilibrium. This view marked a major change from the earlier political economists who saw capitalism as dynamic and expansive: “Suddenly capitalism was no longer seen as an historic social vehicle under constant tension but as a static, rather historyless mode of organization” (177). Edgeworth was part of a growing class of professional economists that focused less on philosophy and more on transforming economics into mathematical dogma.
In contrast to economists like Edgeworth, underworld economists focused on the sociopolitical context of economics, often expressing their ideas comedically. Frederic Bastiat deployed ridicule and humor to point out the absurdities of contemporary capitalism, particularly how greed was rationalized under the cover of improving the public good. Henry George argued that economics failed to solve the problem of poverty. In his book, Progress and Poverty, he mocked those whose incomes came not from work, but from having the good fortune to hold productive land. He proposed a single massive land tax that would encompass all rental income, thus removing the need for any other taxes and giving the government the means to abolish social ills.
In addition to underground mockery of capitalism, this period saw a massive change in attitudes towards colonialism and empire, which were now regarded as “the greatest secular agency for good the world has ever known” (191). The race for empire brought prosperity for European powers, which trickled down to the working class. Professional economists ignored colonialism, writing only about the impact it had on trade, but those in the underworld recognized imperialism as a fundamental change in the character of capitalism, one which demonstrated capitalism’s tendency to provoke war.
John Hobson, excluded from the respectable world of professional economics for arguing that economic depression was caused by excess saving, turned his attention towards Africa and colonialism. Marx had argued that capitalism would destroy itself; Hobson feared that it would destroy the world. He defined imperialism as capitalism’s relentless tendency to rescue itself from domestic economic troubles through foreign commercial conquest, creating a constant risk of war.
Hobson argued that capitalism’s fatal flaw was the unequal distribution of wealth, a problem most people viewed as a shortage of individual and public morality rather than as an inherent defect of the market system. Neither rich nor poor could consume enough: the poor because their incomes were too small, and the rich because they had insufficient capacity to consume what was left over. The rich saved money, not because they wanted to, but because they could not spend or invest their full incomes.
The only way to reinvest these savings without worsening overproduction problem was to invest overseas—thus, the genesis of imperialism. Countries raced to seize the richest colonial markets, creating conditions for war “not by swashbuckling adventures of high tragedy, but through a sordid process in which capitalist nations compete for outlets for their unemployed wealth” (197). Thinkers like Lenin would later integrate Hobson’s ideas into their interpretations of Marxism, arguing that imperialism violently extracted wealth from the colonies and gave it to a parasitic class at home.
The most renowned economist of the Victorian world was Alfred Marshall who, unlike Hobson and other members of the underworld, was middle-of-the-road, official, and socially respectable. His commercially successful book, The Principles of Economics, combined mathematical precision with an accessible style easily understood by business owners and professionals. Marshall saw time as the essential element in restoring market equilibrium. He believed equilibrium changed in meaning depending on the contextual adjustment period; demand determined short-term pricing, but in the long term, production costs ultimately determined market value. He emphasized the individual in economic analysis, ignoring the political context of economics; power and obedience were not relevant to the study of a society comprised of individuals maximizing their own happiness.
Unlike most Victorian economists, Thorstein Veblen carried on the worldly philosophers’ tradition of examining why things were as they were: the nature of economic man, his rites, his rituals, and his customs. Born to an immigrant farming family, he completed a Ph.D. but, lacking job prospects, spent the next seven years living at home. He eventually took a job at the University of Chicago, where his peers recognized his intellect but disliked his personality; he similarly delighted in driving students away from his classes.
Veblen’s first book, The Theory of the Leisure Class, published when he was 42, became an unexpected sensation. A satire on the ways of the rich and aristocratic classes, it also delved into how and why people allowed the existence of a leisure class. Classical economists thought those who rose to the top used their fortune to minimize their own labor; Veblen disagreed, believing neither that rational self-interest bound society together nor that people inherently preferred leisure to work.
Veblen based his ideas on a study of primitive communities. In some, members took pride in work, and they worked out if concern for future generations, often looking on leisure with derision. In other communities, such as in feudal Japan, the leisure class also worked hard—at seizing wealth from productive members of society, often with the full support of the community itself. In these societies, labor, not leisure, invited derision. Unlike Marx and Hobson, who saw natural enmity between capitalists and workers, Veblen saw none. As in feudal Japan, the modern leisure class wanted “the predatory seizure of goods without work” (232), and the modern lower classes sought not to abolish the leisure class, but to emulate it.
Veblen then published The Theory of Business Enterprise in 1904, portraying the businessman as the saboteur of the system. Machines produce goods, not value and profits; therefore, the capitalists were inherently part of the leisure class because they contributed nothing to the functioning of the machine. The capitalist sought not to help make goods, but to cause breakdowns, leverage the confusion, and make a profit. The capitalist’s medium, the financial system, sat above the real world of production and constantly disrupted it.
Veblen concluded that capitalism would eventually decline at the hands of the engineer, rather than at the hands of the worker, as the communists had asserted. He believed those who come in contact with machines, which Veblen foresaw would increasingly dominate every aspect of life, tended to think like machines and thus reject the leisure class: “And so society divided; not poor against rich, but technician versus businessman, mechanic against warlord, scientist opposed to ritualist” (239). Veblen saw the introduction of machinery into every aspect of life as a revolution comparable to the domestication of animals. Businessmen would become mere bureaucrats managing the machine, owing to “the emergence of technology and science as the leading forces of social change in modern times” (245).
Heilbroner’s second wave of worldly philosophers challenged the economic orthodoxy in a world where specialized practitioners of economics had stopped asking larger questions. Many professional economists like Alfred Marshall examined smaller questions in great detail, removed politics and history from analysis, emphasized static equilibrium, and employed mathematics heavily. Heilbroner focuses more attention on those who, because they continued to ask more philosophical questions, found themselves excluded from the respectable, professional world of economics.
Just as he seeks to rehabilitate Adam Smith, Heilbroner also recasts Marx as an economist rather than a mere political revolutionary. Heilbroner points to how Marx developed his analysis in Das Kapital. Instead of merely pointing out the manifest social problems in his time, Marx created a model of the most ideal capitalism to demonstrate how even a perfect capitalist system was doomed to break down.
During the time of Marx, many feared the market system might collapse. Weak monarchies failed, and workers launched popular uprisings that seized control of cities. These uprisings were spontaneous, undisciplined, and aimless. Though workers made initial gains, the old order mercilessly crushed them. But a group of working-class leaders, the Communist League, of which Marx was a member, saw the uprisings of 1848 as a dress rehearsal for the revolution to come. Marx did more than just provide another model of the economic world. Rather than trying to understand economic laws, he critiqued capitalism itself. Capitalism never entirely collapsed, but it was taken over by communism in Russia and China, and by fascism in Germany and Italy, for reasons that Marx predicted: worsening economic crises that destroyed faith in capitalism, and ineffective governments that failed to rise above the interests of a single class.
Marx’s successors, skeptics of imperialism like Hobson, saw the impersonal forces of the market system as contributors to war. In the quest for empire, Hobson believed that capitalist states responded to economic troubles at home, most often caused by wealth and income inequality, by exporting crises to the colonies. Because all imperialist states had the same goal, they came into conflict over the most profitable colonies, eventually leading to war. Apologists for colonialism disagreed, viewing colonialism as a cost center, virtuous for its “civilizing” mission. Although some colonies did not make a profit, others rewarded their mother countries handsomely, creating domestic industries that could not exist without the colonial market. “From country to country the motives might differ, but the common denominator of economic gain was to be found in all” (201).
Imperialism is best understood as part of the process of the internationalization of capital. World War II was the beginning of the end of the colonial system, though many newly independent nations remained impoverished and weak in the late 20th century. Multinational companies emerged and became the primary agents for moving capital from one country to another. They changed geographic flows—instead of extracting resources, they invested in manufacturing and labor—and they tended to introduce advanced technology, which led to cheap labor. Today, these multinational companies stand astride the globe, coexisting uneasily with old national borders.
America once challenged many Euro-centric notions of how the market system worked. Americans deeply opposed hereditary rank and title, and the national culture prized individual independence. Unlike Europe, where entrance to the aristocracy was based on bloodline, entry into American the upper class only required money. Business in America, therefore, became more competitive—less “gentlemanly”—and frequently involved violence, fraud, and other illegal activities. Until Veblen, American economists contributed little, rationalizing such activities as necessities of capitalism.
Veblen died a few months before the great crash of 1929, and his legacy is one of extremes. His descriptions of the leisure class and the businessman suited the era of robber barons, but he failed to consider that business could adapt itself to a changing world. He did identify a central process of change that other economists had overlooked: machines not merely as tools of capitalists, but as major players in modern economic life.
Unencumbered by a feudal past, America showed a pragmatism that allowed it to navigate economic crisis during the 1920s and 1930s, seeming to prove Marx wrong. Today, factors like increasing income inequality, political influence by the wealthy bordering on oligarchy, and acrimonious partisanship, which has all but paralyzed government, has again led some to question whether capitalism can survive. Marx saw history as an arena in which social classes struggle for supremacy. His theories were not infallible, but anyone who wishes to seriously think about economics must take Marx seriously.