The Power Broker: Robert Moses and the Fall of New York

Moses’s plan for parks succeeded due to his focus on other infrastructure. In his plans, the public parks required a vast network of expensive road systems. These parkways needed to be built on inexpensive land. As such, the parkways meant “real estate transactions” (207), meaning that people with foreknowledge of the plans could buy cheap real estate in the current moment and sell it to the government for good money. Since many people could make a great deal of money, Moses could exchange this profitable foreknowledge for political favors. The idealism of Moses’s youth gave way to pragmatic politicking. At the same time, however, Moses was working on a deadline. Smith would not run for reelection in 1926, and the incoming governor would not be as friendly to Moses.

To accomplish his ambitions, Moses outmaneuvered his naïve rivals and played on “the greed of real estate developers” (212). He felt protected from repercussions against his legislative sleight of hand because any politician who stood against him would be standing against public parks, siding themselves with the wealthy landowners and admitting that they did not read his legislation in enough detail.

While Moses slowed legal cases against him, he began work on the parks and ignored any opposition. Even Macy, whose case against Moses was legally valid, could not compete with the government’s legal resources. Moses also deliberately underestimated the cost of his projects, believing that no politician would ever refuse to give him the rest of his funding because “the possibilities for a polite but effective form of political blackmail were endless” (219). Construction work began on the parkways. At the beaches, Moses planned vast and expensive facilities with unique architectural flourishes that, according to the engineers, were impossible. He demanded that they find him a solution.

Moses won his “battle over the bathhouses” with the architects (226), but time was running out with the gubernatorial election looming. He worked tirelessly, spending every possible second of his day working on his project, and he demanded the same of his employees. They did not resent his demands, as working for Moses was “exciting” (228). He was a harsh but fair boss who demanded that they do their best work at all times. When money ran out on one project, Moses borrowed money and paid the employees himself until the state could reimburse him.

A key problem, however, was the baymen of Babylon on Long Island. Their small community was against his plans. Moses discovered that according to an archaic law, their land still technically belonged to the state. He blackmailed the local government into holding a referendum on whether his plans could continue and then proceeded to rig the referendum in his favor. According to the furious locals, the result was “nothing short of a crime” (237), but Moses succeeded. By the end of 1928, there were 14 parks in New York City as opposed to just one in 1924. The value of the parkland held by the state increased 15 times over. As Moses’s beach facilities began to open, more and more people used them, and they were soon immensely popular.

Moses’s plans were very expensive. One population he curried favor with was park custodians, “wealthy men who owned underdeveloped land in scenic areas” who dedicated their lives to preserving these natural beauty spots (239). Moses convinced the men to side with him as he expanded his plans for the parks.

As Moses abandoned his idealism for pragmatism, his character also changed, revealing a “dark element” (241). Caro calls back to Moses’s mother and grandmother’s arrogance and determination and discusses how it manifests in Robert. He showed contempt for those he felt were “considerably beneath him” (242), including the public he served and anyone who stood in the way of his power.

One example is the old park custodians, the wealthy individuals who believed that Moses shared their desire to preserve the parkland. They joined forces with him through a series of committees, but using underhand tactics, Moses slowly took power from them. Eventually, the public-spirited men realized that Moses lied to them, but it was already too late. Likewise, the other politicians only realized the power Moses had amassed when they could no longer counter it. Smith was his constant ally, using the parks as clear evidence of his effectiveness as a politician.

Through reform work, the position of governor became increasingly powerful. Smith used his power to improve working conditions and launch “the first large-scale, low-cost housing program in the United States” (261). Moses was less interested in these social welfare programs; he was still, on paper, a registered Republican.

Moses maintained his interest in reorganizing the New York government structure, and in 1927, he was appointed as New York’s first Secretary of State. This was the first time that he received “a substantial salary” (263), much to his mother’s relief. Moses tried to enact many reforms, and some failed, such as his attempt to take over the state’s boxing commission. However, he emerged with a positive reputation as someone fighting on behalf of the working man. Moses also accelerated Smith’s plans to build hospitals and asylums, working harder than ever. He educated and trained those under his command, even refining their “use of the English language” so that they could be more effective (272). He rewarded his employees by building them free houses on parkland at the government’s expense.

Moses showed a complete “disregard for law” (276), but he was also willing to compromise. He worked with the wealthy men of Long Island to reroute his parkway around their land, but he offered no such help to the poor farmers whose farms he destroyed in pursuit of his dream.

He became even more powerful when Al Smith ran for president in 1928. He took over running New York while Smith campaigned. However, Smith lost, in no small part due to anti-Catholic bias in much of the country. This could be seen in “the fiery crosses that burned on the hills of Kansas and Oklahoma” (283). Smith’s loss foreshadowed a future in which Moses needed to work under a different governor. This new governor, Franklin Delano Roosevelt, became his “deadliest enemy” (282).

Franklin Delano Roosevelt and Moses “went back a very long way” (283). Roosevelt represented many of the wealthy protestant upstate New Yorkers, unlike the working-class Al Smith and Moses. Though Roosevelt was often excluded from the inner circle of Smith’s government, Moses brought him to social events. During this time, Bella Moskowitz (correctly) considered Roosevelt a “very dangerous threat” (286) to Smith’s dreams of becoming president. Roosevelt and Moses both claimed to love parks, though their visions were very different. Squabbles over competing budgets for park projects caused the two men to break permanently from one another.

Smith would always take Moses’s side, even though he needed Roosevelt to secure the Democratic nomination for president. He convinced Roosevelt to succeed him as New York governor. When Smith failed to secure the presidential nomination, Roosevelt still became the governor, and Moses had to work alongside a man who hated him. Smith blamed anti-Catholic prejudice for his loss and took over the presidency of the Empire State Building Corporation in semi-retirement. Moses, meanwhile, blamed Roosevelt for his friend’s humiliation, especially as Roosevelt ostracized Smith from New York politics and followed none of his suggestions. Thanks to Moses’s political maneuvering, however, he could not be fired by Roosevelt, though he resigned as Secretary of State.

Moses was no longer working for a governor of “unquestioning loyalty” (299). He continued to plan the Northern State Parkway but struggled to fit it around the properties of the wealthy Long Islanders. Eventually, he agreed to a bitter compromise.

Roosevelt and Moses had a combinative relationship, but the governor signed most of Moses’s bills, and realizing that Moses could cut through bureaucratic processes, he increased his power. Moses, conversely, refused all of Roosevelt’s “patronage suggestions” (305). Moses knew the government system better than anyone, especially the governor, who arrived in his office “with little preparation” (306). When he followed Moses’s advice, he was able to pass budgets and bills.

Moses opened the Southern State Parkway to great fanfare. Record attendance meant that he had to deal with issues like littering, which he did by publicly shaming litterers. As the beach facilities became more crowded, Moses planned to expand them.

Meanwhile, many people profited from real estate and business ventures along the Long Island parkway system. There was, however, “constant friction” (313) over Moses’s budget requests. Whenever anyone refused Moses, he threatened to resign. Since he was a beloved public figure, no one dared fire him, and he got his way. In return, Moses involved Roosevelt in the grand opening of his parks. He also made space for Al Smith, saying there was “more than enough credit to go around” (315).

Moses was a violent and argumentative bully, but the politicians appreciated that he could get things done. Roosevelt did not even intervene when he learned that Moses was “discouraging Negroes from using many of his state parks” (318). He designed his parks to make them inaccessible to people of color, and he even lowered the temperature in swimming pools because he believed that African Americans did not “like cold water” (319).

When Roosevelt ran for president in 1932, Al Smith ran against him. Moses worked for the Smith campaign, even while he was still technically working for Governor Roosevelt. Smith lost, and the depressing loss stayed with Moses for a long time.

In 1932, New York City was filled with “half-completed skyscrapers” (323). The Great Depression caused many building projects in the city to halt. Many people were out of work and increasingly desperate for money, and the government did “little to help its people” (324). Judge Samuel Seabury issued a report detailing the rampant corruption in the city, and most of the budget was spent servicing debt. In contrast, Moses’s public works projects on Long Island such as his parks were “especially galling” for their success (328).

The sheer number of cars in the city was causing an issue, as many of the highways and roads were simply not built to accommodate such a sharp increase in automobile use. Furthermore, the city’s disused and depressing parks were “scabs on the face of the city” (331). Mothers did not want their children to play in parks filled with “drunks and loafers” (331). Even Central Park had fallen into an embarrassing state of disrepair. In a growing city, “breathing spaces” were increasingly desired by political reformers (337). Rather than repair the parks, however, Mayor Jimmy Walker adopted the Central Park Casino—a restaurant in the park—and turned it into a gala celebration of his own corruption. Moses turned his eyes to New York City and began to plot parks, playgrounds, bridges, and other infrastructure, but he struggled to convince those in power to fund his ambitious vision.

By 1933, the Good Government movement sought to reform New York politics. Moses, a long-time associate of the reform movement, was idolized by many of its members, though they knew “nothing of his methods” (348). They revered his ability to push his projects through, blurring his arrogance and ruthlessness into a brilliant desire to achieve. The reformers founded a City Fusion Party to bring together various political movements in opposition to the Democrat-led Tammany Hall.

Moses was a favored Fusion candidate for mayor, but Judge Seabury— who exposed so much of the corruption in the state—vetoed him. Seabury disliked Al Smith, and he disliked Moses by association. Instead, the Fusion Party nominated a little-known half-Jewish, half-Italian politician named Fiorello La Guardia. Moses was denied an almost certain opportunity to become mayor of New York City. When La Guardia won the election, he invited Moses into his government. La Guardia trusted Moses to write legislation, not realizing that Moses was using his talents as a bill drafter to give himself almost unprecedented power.

In 1934, Governor Lehman officially made Moses the first commissioner of the citywide Parks Department. He quickly assembled a team who would work at the furious pace he demanded. Whenever a politician tried to hinder or delay him, Moses threatened to quit, and La Guardia or Lehman would step in on his behalf because his public works were too valuable a political commodity to risk.

Moses’s direct, combative attitude carried over to the way he dealt with labor union officials. He took advantage of the government’s work programs as much as possible to rush through his immense projects. The renovation of New York City’s parks won Moses public acclaim. He achieved this even as New York went through a financial crisis by haggling, bargaining, and swapping favors. Moses was able to “see opportunities everywhere” (377) and built parks, playgrounds, and a zoo in Central Park. He held a large ceremony for the zoo’s opening, with Al Smith (a renowned animal lover) as the guest of honor. Smith was made Honorary Night Superintendent of the Central Park Zoo, and he loved the privilege of visiting the animals late at night.

At the same time, the Triborough Bridge was also being built. The colossal project was the biggest endeavor in Moses’s career, allowing him to tie together three boroughs (The Bronx, Manhattan, and Queens) and make his Long Island parks even more accessible. To accomplish this, he overcame engineering issues, zoning issues, and the vestigial influence of corrupt Tammany Hall officials. The bridge became Moses’s “triumph of imagination over seemingly insoluble problems” (392).

While Moses was building parks, bridges, and stadiums, however, the city sorely needed hospitals and health centers, which he had no interest in providing. He also tore down Jimmy Walker’s Casino in Central Park, ignoring the pleas of historical preservationists to enact his revenge on Walker—on Al Smith’s behalf.

Moses was convinced to run for governor of New York in 1934. After many years of positioning himself in the press as the enemy of “the forces of influence, privilege and wealth” (402), Moses sided with the Republicans, who were funded by the same wealthy interests he first battled on Long Island. In the intervening years, he had become much more accommodating to their needs and far less idealistic in his pursuit of getting things done. In accepting the nomination, Moses caused his old enemy, W. Kingsland Macy, to be ousted as chair of the New York Republican Party.

As Moses began to campaign, however, he showed that he was not as talented a politician as many expected. He argued with the press and refused to “pander to the people” (410). The hard-nosed, uncompromising, and intimidating figure from behind the scenes proved much less charismatic when campaigning for election. He also caused offense by distancing himself from his Jewish roots to win the support of people who would always consider him Jewish. He campaigned in an aggressive, negative style against Governor Lehman and failed to land any significant blows against his opponent.

Moses could not even rely on the support of Al Smith, who could bring himself to endorse anyone but a Democrat. Moses was roundly defeated at the ballot box, while his old enemy, Franklin Roosevelt—now president of the United States—was receiving plaudits for his New Deal social programs. Despite his loss and his negative campaign against Lehman, Moses held on to his positions of administrative power. He returned to his previous role away from public scrutiny, where his contempt for the common man could remain hidden behind a carefully constructed public persona.

Moses’s electoral misstep only resulted in a temporary loss of popularity. He recovered his reputation through his ongoing battle against President Roosevelt, who told Mayor La Guardia to dismiss Moses from the Triborough Bridge Authority. La Guardia stalled, but Roosevelt threatened to deny federal funding to New York City unless Moses was removed. La Guardia, a “shrewdly calculating politician” (430), was concerned about being the man who fired Moses, as he was still very popular among voters.

Moses leaked the plot against him to the press and made himself look like a “hero” fighting against a villainous president. Roosevelt pressed forward with his demand, trying to ignore the public outcry, while La Guardia continued to stall. Eventually, the president summoned the mayor to a “secret meeting” to find a way to backtrack while saving face. Al Smith had been holding off from pledging his public support for Moses until he judged the moment was right. He declared his support for Moses and the Triborough Bridge Authority, and his support was enough to force Roosevelt and La Guardia to back down. The Triborough Bridge opened with a ceremony on July 11, 1936, and La Guardia and Roosevelt both attended.

La Guardia began to master the role of mayor of New York City but still struggled to assert his authority over Moses. While he bullied and fired many subordinates, La Guardia was kept waiting by Moses. They had frequent arguments, during which Moses threatened to resign. This threat—whether it was sincere or not—allowed the popular parks commissioner to win each argument until La Guardia devised the tactic of treating his threats like a joke.

They argued over the Rockaway Ferry, a low-cost transportation option that Moses wanted to shut down. La Guardia pleaded with Moses not to tear down the ferry terminal until an investigation could be concluded. Moses threatened to resign, shut down parks, and leak his story to the press, creating a “public outcry” until he got what he wanted (452).

Despite their frequent arguments, La Guardia and Moses developed a working relationship. La Guardia appreciated Moses’s unique ability to secure funding for projects and make them a reality. La Guardia, a natural enthusiast for any engineering project, was given front-row seats to many building projects and a wealth of “pageantry” (455). Moses lavished attention on the mayor, newspaper editors, and anyone else whose support he needed. As a result, no one wanted to criticize him. He turned himself into a “myth,” an essential aspect for any political figure who wants to build public works quickly and visibly. Moses’s conservative politics allowed him to form alliances with the “Old Guard Republican legislators” whom he fought in his youth (466). As he built power, Moses made himself powerful and indispensable to New York’s wealthiest and most influential people.

Moses planned to “remake” New York City. As the economy recovered from the Great Depression, however, he had to search elsewhere for funding and manpower that was provided by New Deal programs. To build as quickly as possible, he ignored bureaucracy and cut through administrative red tape. He smeared anyone who impeded him, revealing scandals or accusing them of being communists. His “bloodhounds” compiled folders of research to fuel these scandals; when they could not find anything, Moses lied. He destroyed the reputations of men like Paul J. Kern, La Guardia’s law secretary, for daring to oppose his projects. Frequently, he also lied about the true cost and scope of his building projects. To reshape the city, he knocked down communities and buildings that existed for decades. In particular, he did not hesitate to destroy working-class or nonwhite neighborhoods. He refused to engage with local communities to learn their needs, preferring to impose his projects rather than tailor his works to suit the individual needs of a community. He built many parks, for example, but rarely built them in poor, African American, or Puerto Rican neighborhoods.

People’s relationships with automobiles changed; cars were no longer a “pursuit for comfortable middle-class or wealthy fathers” but an essential part of the daily commute (483). Nevertheless, Moses—who never learned to drive and was chauffeured everywhere in a lavish limousine—still believed that the world should be shaped around the driving experience. His aides became increasingly submissive, and he never entertained any criticism.

He worked constantly on many different projects, so many that he could no longer devote personal attention to each one. Many of the smaller projects suffered as a result. Typically, he cared less about any project in a poor area of the city. He hardly built anything in Harlem and designed the city’s infrastructure to limit bus access, as buses were chiefly used by the people from the lowest socioeconomic class. For example, the overpasses on the roads he built were too low for buses to drive underneath. As such, the poor had no way to access his vast parks. People also noticed that Moses’s conception of parks involved concrete and infrastructure rather than natural spaces. He ignored such comments.