The Economic Consequences of the Peace

“Reparation” is the most extensive chapter in this book. This detailed study is coming from Keynes the economist rather than Keynes as a witness of an important historic event, the Paris Peace Conference. It features extensive footnoted numerical data on prewar (1913) and postwar conditions (1918) and several examinations of different case scenarios, some of which are hypothetical. The author divides this chapter into five main sections: “I. Undertakings Given Prior to the Peace Negotiations” (50), “II. The Conference and the Terms of the Treaty” (57), “III. Germany’s Capacity to Pay” (67), “IV. The Reparation Commission” (80), and “V. The German Counter-Proposals” (84). The goal of “Reparations” is to use mathematical analysis and historic information to back up the overall claim of this book—that the Treaty of Versailles is not just harmful to Germany but detrimental to all of Europe.

“Undertakings Given Prior to the Peace Negotiations” discusses the damage claims by the victors, for instance, Britain, France, and Belgium. Keynes underscores the difficulty of accurately assessing the material damage and, on that basis, calculating the appropriate reparations. Indeed, military historians often note the problems that arise with assessing war numbers—from the accurate assessment of casualties to infrastructure damage—even in the modern