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AristotleRhetoric
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Book 2, Chapters 19-26Chapter Summaries & Analyses
Book 2
Book 2, Chapters 19-22 Summary: “Artful Proofs–Possibility and Magnitude, Example, Maxim”
Aristotle introduces four common lines of argument (or topoi, singular topos, in Greek) found in all three branches of oratory: possibility (most useful for deliberative); past fact (most useful for forensic); future possibility (also useful for deliberative); and magnitude, or the relative greatness of things (most useful for epideictic). These topoi form a store of general knowledge that a speaker can use to construct an argument.
Beginning with the Possible and Impossible, Aristotle establishes that there are various conditions which make things possible; for example, one might consider whether a given event has a necessary antecedent. In determining whether something is impossible, the speaker should make the opposite considerations.
Regarding Past Fact, Aristotle suggests a number of ways to determine whether an event has occurred, for example: “[I]f the less probable of two things has occurred, the more probable should have occurred as well” (145). Future Fact operates on the same principles as Past Fact, but transposed to the likelihood of future events. Finally, Aristotle advises magnifying or diminishing events in comparison with other events as needed.
He now moves on to three more universal topoi: Example; Maxim; and Enthymeme. Aristotle in fact argues that maxim is more appropriately a category of enthymeme, but he still discusses maxims at some length.
As for Example, there are two kinds: historical (lessons learned from historical events) and invented (lessons learned from fictional events, fables, etc.). Regarding historical examples, Aristotle recommends finding parallel events from the past for lessons. For invented examples, a speaker could use either an example of their own invention or a recognized fable. Aristotle finds that historical examples are best, “since in the long run things will turn out in future as they actually have turned out in the past” (149). Examples are best deployed as confirmation of enthymemes.
Aristotle views a Maxim as a form of enthymeme, because it serves essentially as a syllogism with only the premise stated. If one were to add an explanation to their maxim, they would have a complete enthymeme. Aristotle offers an example from Euripides: “There is no man in all ways happy [...] There is none of mankind that is free” (150). The first half is a maxim, whereas the latter half is the explanation. There are four kinds of maxims: no reason given because its truth is widely acknowledged; no reason given because it is obvious at first glance; reason given, as part of an enthymeme; and maxims with the reason implied in the statement. Aristotle concludes his discussion of maxims by advising the speaker on the best circumstances for their use, and how to choose fitting maxims.
Book 2, Chapters 22-26 Summary: “Artful Proofs–Enthymemes”
To conclude Book 2, Aristotle turns to Enthymeme. The author advises on the correct deployment of enthymeme; the logical chain should not be long, and the argument should be based in real knowledge and familiarity with the subject. He also divides enthymemes into two types: “(1) Demonstrative Enthymemes, which prove that a thing is, or is not, so and so; and (2) Refutative Enthymemes, [which controvert the Demonstrative]” (158).
Aristotle now lists 28 topoi, or lines of argument, for enthymemes. These suggest premises for the speaker’s logos. For example, the topos of “opposites” allows the speaker to discern qualities about something by examining its opposite; “degrees” of more and less forms an a fortiori argument; “division” has the speaker break down the basis of an opposing argument and refute its constituent parts. “Sham” enthymemes, or spurious arguments, include fallaciously drawing conclusions about the whole from the parts, or vice versa; indignation; or attributing intent to chance.
Having demonstrated how to construct both good and bad enthymemes, Aristotle now advises how to refute the enthymemes of others. There are two approaches: counter-enthymeme or objection. Objections come from four bases: attacking your opponent’s premise; adducing another premise like it; adducing a contrary premise; and adducing previous decisions (drawing examples from the past).
Finally, there are four sources of enthymemes: probabilities; examples; infallible signs (evidence about which there is no doubt); and fallible signs (evidence that can be refuted). Aristotle concludes this book by pointing out that refutative enthymemes are still enthymemes, whereas objections are designed to show the error in the opponent’s enthymeme.
Book 2, Chapters 19-26 Analysis
The structure of this second portion of Book 2 can be somewhat confusing; essentially, Aristotle begins with a fairly broad view of common lines of argumentation and gradually narrows this scope. The author outlines, first, the common topoi, or lines of argument, that feature in argumentation: possibility, past fact, future fact, and magnitude. The means of arguing these topoi are, strictly speaking, example and enthymeme. Narrowing in even further, the author enumerates common topoi for enthymemes, both real and fallacious. All of the elements discussed in this section are meant to be common to all three branches of rhetoric (deliberative, forensic, and epideictic), although some are better suited to certain branches over others.
The form of argument discussed in this section, relying primarily on logic, reflects the limitations of both ancient evidence and ancient audiences. Whereas the “non-artistic” arguments (witnesses, torture, etc.) received merely a passing mention earlier in the work, methods of argumentation from logic—and particularly enthymemes—form the majority of Book 2 (with brief discussion in Book 1, Chapters 2 to 3). Since objective truth is near-impossible to ascertain with the available tools, it becomes supremely important for the speaker to be able to spin any available information in his favor and to speak confidently on any subject that arises.
The limitations of the audience follow closely upon the limitations of the evidence. Since objective truth as the modern reader would recognize it is cast aside, success in argumentation is entirely dependent on the opinions of the listeners. An awareness of the audience permeates this section of the book. For example, the best arguments aren’t the most logically sound, but rather those that are most pleasing to the audience: “But of all syllogisms [...] those are most applauded of which we foresee the conclusion from the outset—so long as it is not too obvious, for part of are pleasure is at our own sagacity” (172). Aristotle elaborates a similar concept: “These are the reasons why uneducated men are more effective than the educated in speaking to the masses […] Educated men lay down abstract principles and draw general conclusions; the uneducated argue from their everyday knowledge, and base their conclusions upon immediate facts” (156).
This awareness also comes out earlier in the work, when Aristotle introduces enthymemes: “(A succession of syllogisms forming a chain of logic will be hard to follow) because of its length, for we assume the judge [audience] to be of but ordinary intelligence” (12). Throughout his investigation of logical argument, Aristotle’s tone occasionally betrays contempt for the audience of common listeners. As is evidenced throughout this discussion, however, his rhetoric must also respect the methods that are most effective in the context of Athenian democracy.
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