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Having addressed non-artistic proofs and the three kinds of oratory, Aristotle devotes Book 2 to artistic proofs beginning with character and emotion. He explains the importance of this examination: “[T]he speaker must not merely see to it that his speech [as an argument] shall be convincing and persuasive, but he must [in and by the speech] give the right impression of himself, and get his judge [audience] into the right state of mind” (91). Aristotle divides the character (ethos) of the speaker into three parts: intelligence; character; and good will—he will return to this topic later. The author also broadly divides all emotions into three points which the speaker must bear in mind if he is to excite any emotion in his listener: the listener’s mental state; who is usually the target of their emotion; and what factors usually cause this emotion in the listener.
What follows is an examination of 14(often opposing, but not always) emotions: anger; mildness; friendship; enmity or hatred; fear; confidence; shame; shamelessness; benevolence; pity; indignation; envy; emulation; and contempt. For each, Aristotle provides definitions and examines the circumstances that are often attendant. Some emotions receive more in-depth treatment than others.
Aristotle argues that anger is caused by slights, which come in three forms: contempt; spite; and hubris (a Greek term generally translated as wanton insult, outrage, or insolence). Mildness is the opposite of anger and can hence be thought of in opposite terms. With the knowledge of these emotions and their causes, the speaker can excite or suppress either emotion in his own listeners. This method applies to all the other emotions.
Aristotle defines friends (associated with the emotion of friendship)as those “who have come to regard the same things as good and the same things as evil” (103). The opposite of friendship is enmity or hatred. Fear arises from an awareness of impending danger, and people who sense that they will soon suffer tend to feel afraid. Confidence is the opposite of fear, and it generally appears in those who have much experience or no experience at all. Shame arises from vices or a lack of virtues. Men feel ashamed before anyone whose opinions they value or who could cause them embarrassment. Shamelessness forms its opposite.
Benevolence could be defined as altruistic kindness, and an orator can excite benevolence or its opposite by showing need (or a lack thereof). Audiences feel pity when someone with whom they feel allied suffers, and men are more likely to feel pity if they have experience or understanding of that suffering. The opposite of pity is indignation, which Aristotle sees as outrage targeted “at undeserved prosperity; since whatever comes to a man against his deserts violates the principle of justice” (123). Envy arises when men see another’s good and want it for themselves. Emulation is nearly identical to envy, but with the positive effect that it inspires men to prepare for and work toward the good that they see in others. Contempt, at last, is the opposite of emulation.
Aristotle moves now to character (ethos) and an examination of factors that can cause different audiences to react differently. This outline also considers what sort of speech and action seems natural coming from various characters. The author considers two factors in character: age and fortune (as in luck).
He begins with an outline of the characteristics of youth. In general, according to Aristotle, the young have strong desires. They love honor over wealth; they are naive, hopeful, shy, ambitious, and they “carry everything too far: they love to excess, they hate to excess—and so in all else” (134). The elderly, on the other hand, exhibit almost the exact opposite traits, since experience has taught them to be cautious and cynical. Aristotle advises the speaker to bear these qualities in mind when addressing audiences primarily composed of either group. Aristotle defines the prime of life: “The body is in its prime from thirty years of age to five-and-thirty, and the soul about forty-nine” (137). This is the point at which men achieve an ideal balance between the excesses of youth and old age.
Moving on to fortune, Aristotle begins by touching upon good birth—which does not necessarily connote wealth. Those of noble origins tend to look down on others, although hereditary nobility does not imply moral superiority. Aristotle also points out that successive generations can degenerate into insanity or stupidity. Following good birth, Aristotle tells us that wealth has a corrupting influence; the wealthy are given to insolence and licentiousness, although not necessarily malice. Power has a similar corrupting influence: “[M]en in power are characterized by a higher ambition and greater manliness” (140). When the powerful do commit crimes, they tend to be of greater magnitude than the crimes of the wealthy.
Aristotle concludes this section with a summary of the arguments of his work thus far, reiterating the three types of oratory and their different aims. He describes what is to come in the rest of the work, including discussions of the forms of argument (topoi) that are common to all three types.
Having formed a broad outline of the art of rhetoric and the three types of rhetoric in Book 1, Aristotle devotes Book 2 to the “artful” proofs that are common to all three styles. The three artful proofs are logical argument (logos), emotion (pathos), and character (ethos). The latter two receive their treatment here in the first part of Book 2.
Aristotle’s treatment of emotion, which primarily takes the form of extensive lists of attendant circumstances, is intended to equip the speaker with the ability to excite appropriate emotional responses from his audience: “By these, the emotions, are meant those states which are attended by pain and pleasure, and which, as they change, make a difference in our judgments [of the same thing]” (92). Aristotle presents emotional appeal here as a useful persuasive tool.
This encouragement is a curious change from Book 1, in which Aristotle devotes some time to denigrating emotional appeal in oratory: “[T]he man who is to judge should not have his judgment warped by speakers arousing him to anger, jealousy, or compassion” (2). Here, Aristotle champions only the use of pure fact in argumentation.
It is worth speculating why Aristotle seems to present two contradictory views of emotional appeal (and both based on the same effect: the potential impact of emotion on the listener’s judgment). One possibility is that Aristotle intended his statements in Book 1 to reflect an idealized rhetoric based only in facts. Another is that the criticism in Book 1 is targeted only against the misuse of emotional appeal. A final consideration is that, in the interval between his writing of Book 1 and Book 2, Aristotle simply changed his mind about emotional appeal in rhetoric. Ultimately, we cannot say with certainty why this contradiction arises, since Aristotle himself offers no explicit acknowledgment or explanation.
There are two ways in which persuasion through character (also known by its technical term, ethopoiia) can help the speaker. One is through establishing his own authority: “[I]n conducing to persuasion it is highly important that the speaker should evince a certain character, and that the judges should conceive him to be disposed towards them in a certain way” (91). The audience must judge the speaker’s character to be trustworthy, in other words, if he is to persuade them. This discussion of character, and the traits associated with various stages of life and degrees of good fortune, also helps the orator to target his audience. An audience made up primarily of one demographic group will respond differently to different approaches, and the speaker can use this knowledge to his persuasive advantage.
By Aristotle