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At the ANC conference at the end of 1952, Chief Albert Luthuli is elected the new president of the ANC, and Mandela becomes one of the four deputy presidents. Mandela soon finds himself under a ban that prohibits him from attending any meetings or gatherings, including his son’s birthday party, for six months.
Mandela proposes that the National Executive Committee develop a plan in case the ANC is banned and must go underground. He is put in charge of developing this Mandela-Plan or M-Plan. After several months, he puts forward his plan for establishing local cells and reporting systems. It is only moderately successful and, once again, confined to the cities.
Meanwhile, Mandela is supporting himself and his family. He works at several law firms before opening his own law office with former classmate Oliver Tambo at the end of 1952. Their office serves mostly Africans who are harassed by the government. Mandela and Tambo themselves suffer this when they are told they may not occupy a business premise in the city without government approval. The case goes against them, but Mandela and Tambo refuse to vacate their offices.
Though the government campaign to clear out Sophiatown under the Western Areas Removal begins in 1950, ANC resistance starts in earnest in 1953. In a speech, Mandela’s passion leads him to declare that “the time for passive resistance had ended...violence was the only weapon that could destroy apartheid” (157). His incites the crowd against the police observing the rally, which places him squarely in the government’s crosshairs. Mandela now believes that the government will ruthlessly suppress any legitimate protest by Africans and that violent struggle will soon become necessary.
The ANC’s Executive Committee strongly reprimands Mandela for his speech, so he reverts to publicly supporting the strategy of nonviolence while privately believe it is a strategic dead end. He also butts heads with ANC leadership over their unwillingness to divulge the details of their meetings with white people in the process of forming a Liberal Party.
That same year, Walter Sisulu is invited to the World Festival of Youth and Students for Peace and Friendship in Bucharest. There is no time to consult the leadership, so Sisulu quickly departs—but not before Mandela convinces him to visit China to see if it will supply weapons for an armed struggle. Sisulu is greeted warmly in China but returns without any weapons.
At a small village where he is trying a case, Mandela is served with a writ requiring him to resign from the ANC. It restricts him to Johannesburg and prohibits him from attending meetings or gatherings. This ban marks the end of Mandela’s public, legal involvement with the ANC. He is still consulted and kept informed, but he is now on the periphery and frustrated by his inability to directly influence the struggle.
Though Mandela is unable to attend the conference of the Transvaal ANC, his speech—now known has the “No Easy Walk to Freedom” speech—is read. He tells the conference that the old forms of resistance are no longer effective, and new strategies must be tried.
In April 1954, the Law Society of the Transvaal applies to strip Mandela of his legal accreditation. Many people offer him legal help, including, to his surprise, some Afrikaner attorneys. This suggests to him that “even in racist South Africa professional solidarity can sometimes transcend color, and that there were still attorney and judges who refused to be the rubber stamps of an immoral regime” (163). Mandela triumphs in court.
In 1953, the NP passes the Bantu Education Act, which transfers control of African education from the Department of Education to the Native Affairs Department. Non-government schools are given the choice of accepting government administration or losing their subsidies. The ANC national conference approves an indefinite school boycott starting April 1, 1955, the day of the takeover. The campaign is sporadic, disorganized, and ultimately unsuccessful. Mandela notes, however, that the campaign succeeded in raising political involvement.
Meanwhile, the Sophiatown antiremoval campaign rages on. The removal is scheduled for February 9, 1955, and after it begins, the residents are only able to resist for a few weeks. So, Sophiatown is demolished. Once more, Mandela finds himself concluding that violent resistance is the only remedy for apartheid.
Additionally, Z.K. Matthews, one of Mandela’s professors from Fort Hare and a high-ranking member of the ANC, returns from a yearlong stay in the U.S. as a visiting scholar. He proposes a national convention for all people to draw up a Freedom Charter laying out a vision of a democratic society with full rights for all peoples. Suggestions for the Charter flood in from all corners of South Africa. The Congress of the People is held on June 25 and 26, 1955. It is attended by 3,000 people of all racial backgrounds. Just before the final vote to ratify the Charter, the police disrupt the conference.
Mandela’s ban expires in September 1955, and he takes the opportunity to visit family in the Transkei and meet with local ANC leaders. He also tries to dissuade K.D. Matanzima (Daliwonga) from his support of the Bantu Authorities Act. As a chief, however, the Act will strengthen Matanzima’s personal power, so Mandela is unable to sway him.
After several weeks, Mandela continues his journey, heading west to Cape Town. There, he witnesses the police raid the offices of New Age, a leftist magazine, as part of a countrywide sting. Mandela knows that a new wave of government repression is on its way, and when he finally returns to Johannesburg, he feels reinvigorated.
Concurrently, the Native Affairs Department, led by Dr. H.F. Verwoerd, proposes the creation of bantustans, essentially a reservation system that divides the African population by tribal affiliation. One of the apartheid government’s major concerns was ensuring physical separation between the white population and everyone else. The creation of the bantustans supported the government’s false narrative that such separation was possible.
In March 1956, Mandela receives his third ban, this one to last for five years. By this point, he finds the bans contemptible and violates them whenever he is able.
The ANC’s failure to prevent Sophiatown’s demolition reminded Mandela not to overpromise. The ANC had no means of preventing the army from forcibly removing Sophiatown’s residents, and Mandela realizes in retrospect that his overheated rhetoric did no good. When a leader cannot deliver, they lose credibility.
Because nonviolent means proved wholly ineffective in preventing the destruction, Mandela’s belief that only armed struggle could end apartheid was strengthened. In public, he followed the ANC leadership’s decision to remain committed to a course of nonviolence, but it is clear he did not believe it. Convincing Walter Sisulu to go to China for aid was evidence of this. Given Mandela’s growing understanding of movement strategy, he likely believed people could be convinced that violence is necessary if nonviolent campaigns continued to fail. As he explained in earlier chapters, he was not committed to nonviolence as a principle unto itself: “[…] if peaceful protest is met with violence, its efficacy is at an end. For me, nonviolence was not a moral principle but a strategy; there is no moral goodness in using an ineffective weapon” (158).
This part of the book also introduces a recurring problem for Mandela and the liberation struggle: traditional African leaders who supported apartheid because it increased their personal power. This prompted K.D. Matanzima, Mandela’s own nephew, to convince the Transkei chiefs to accept the creation of the bantustans. This clinging to a power created by a racist government, rather than supporting the liberation struggle, sowed the seeds of inter-African violence that would erupt in the early 90s.
By Nelson Mandela