Enlightenment Now: The Case for Reason, Science, Humanism, and Progress

In the last chapter, Pinker addresses the third facet of Enlightenment thinking that fuels progress: humanism. Pinker argues that science and reason alone won’t help society progress; we need to direct these pursuits toward humanistic goals. Pinker defines humanism as “the goal of maximizing human flourishing” (410) and calls it an indicator of genuine progress, rather than a practice of simply mastering knowledge or inventions for no specific purpose. Pinker claims that humanist groups are growing and notes that religious congregations increasingly downplay traditional theology in favor of more humanistic preaching, citing Quakers, Nordic Lutherans, and some Jewish humanist groups as examples. Pinker agrees that humanism can seem “bland” but argues that it’s a “distinctive moral commitment” (412) that people must work at. Enlightenment thinkers advanced humanism by arguing for “morality in impartiality” (412)—the concept that giving oneself privilege over others is unreasonable. Spinoza, Hobbes, Kant, Rawl, and Nagel all included this kind of morality in their work, which Pinker notes is similar to the Golden Rule in moral codes around the world. Pinker claims that we can—and should—go further than this approach and clearly lay a “deeper foundation” for human morality. These reminders emphasize the theme The Origins and Influence of Enlightenment Thinking, reaffirming how these thinkers helped shape society for the better.

Because humans are the product of millennia of evolution, we can appreciate the many factors that informed our survival and evolution as a species. Among these are the basic needs that people, as animals, must seek, including “food, comfort, curiosity, beauty, stimulation, love, sex, and camaraderie,” because “if people didn’t seek them, there would be no people” (414). Pinker frames people and their pursuits through an evolutionary lens to emphasize that these activities are basic needs, and not indulgences. However, “ascetic and puritanical regimes” (414) often deny people basic needs by stigmatizing these activities. In contrast, humanism acknowledges the necessity and value of these activities and notes that without them our species wouldn’t exist. In addition, Pinker notes that though humans are vulnerable to violence, violence in society is a “solvable problem,” as evident in its decline over history. Everyone who can think is involved in morality; even “sociopaths” can be persuaded to follow certain moral codes if society makes it difficult enough for them to indulge their violent impulses. Another facet of our evolution, sympathy, is likewise a key part of secular morality. We evolved to feel sympathy—as well as trust, gratitude, guilt, and righteous anger—because these feelings strengthen the social bonds we rely on for survival.

Pinker next addresses the criticism that humanism is too utilitarian—and therefore simplistic—about maximizing happiness for the greatest number of people. Humanism has some utilitarian leanings, but Pinker argues that we can “embrace a broader sense of flourishing” (416), such as education, childhood, and fulfilling experiences, in our evaluation. He reiterates that human rights promote human flourishing, so humanism and human rights “go hand in hand” (416). Humanists can be proud of overlapping with utilitarianism because that philosophy has championed progress such as emancipation, women’s rights, and animal rights. Utilitarians believe that people should be free to pursue their interests and practices if they don’t hurt anyone else. Conversely, deontologists tend to root their beliefs in tribalism, notions of purity, and maintaining social norms—and are thus more likely to ban certain behaviors even if they don’t hurt anyone.

Pinker argues that diverse and cosmopolitan societies should base their moral codes on “simple, transparent principles that everyone can understand and agree upon,” such as the “ideal of human flourishing” (417). He observes that when diverse groups must agree on shared norms, they tend to follow humanistic principles; he points to the UN Declaration of Human Rights as an example. According to Pinker, humanism is a better choice than theistic morality or romantic heroism, which may manifest in the alt-right, neo-fascism, and authoritarian populism.

Some intellectuals believe that humans inherently need “theistic, spiritual, heroic, and tribal beliefs” (419), rendering humanism not necessarily wrong but “unnatural.” Therefore, these intellectuals argue, societies based on humanism will inevitably fall. Pinker notes that recent articles in The New York Times and The Boston Globe claim our society is in decline because an Enlightenment-inspired system neglects people’s emotional and spiritual needs. Pinker repudiates theistic morality, explaining that humanism and religious instruction both encompass the same beneficial moral codes. Moreover, no well-founded reasons exist to believe in God or gods, and scriptures tend to contain “internal contradictions, factual errors […] and scientific absurdities” (421). While people who adhere to theistic morality want to keep it separate from science, Pinker argues that scientific reason can—and should—apply to anything. For example, if prayer worked, we could observe that people who pray daily are free from illness and bad luck, while those who don’t suffer. Pinker acknowledges that some people believe God doesn’t intervene in human life or that God is the same as the laws of the universe, but he argues that these gods are “impotent,” and we should imbue them with moral authority.

The author then confronts two theistic arguments. The first is that physics hasn’t explained how the universe’s forces developed so perfectly that they allowed life and human existence to emerge. Pinker counters this claim by wondering why a god would create the universe to populate it with life but also include so many dangers and disasters. Furthermore, he claims, physicists are closer to explaining the “fundamental constants” that make life possible. While people sometimes find scientific discoveries difficult to comprehend or even offensive, Pinker emphasizes that our “cognitive queasiness is a poor guide to reality” (424) given that many previously offensive findings have been proven true. The other theistic claim Pinker tackles concerns how consciousness is possible. He explains that scientists and evolutionary psychologists have satisfying explanations and that Darwinian adaptation enabled us to develop complex senses and instincts to satisfy our needs for survival. Systems within the human brain constantly access shared information and work together to inform our behavior. Neural networks fire and link the brain’s cortexes together to continue this constant exchange of signals. For Pinker, the existence of consciousness doesn’t require an explanation including souls, psychics, telepathy, or any other unproven phenomena: “Nothing that we know about consciousness is inconsistent with the understanding that it depends entirely on neural activity” (427). This can be hard to grasp because “the mind has nothing but itself to know itself with” (428). Moreover, solving the “problem” of consciousness by introducing the concept of a soul only clouds the matter because it seeks to “solve a mystery with an even bigger mystery” (428).

Pinker follows up this argument by pointing out that even if we could prove that gods exist, we’d have little reason to look to them for a moral compass. He refers to the angry and violent god of the Old Testament to show that we wouldn’t gain in morality by following a deity who finds “nothing particularly wrong with slavery, rape, torture, mutilation, and genocide” (428). Of course, most modern believers don’t endorse these actions because they “read the Bible through the lens of Enlightenment humanism” (429). Religion can, however, prompt immoral behavior, such as violence against nonbelievers. By dictating sacred values and being unwilling to compromise, religions stir conflicts. Pinker notes that numerous religious wars killed a total of 55 million people and argues that “if religion were a source of morality, the number of religious wars and atrocities ought to be zero” (430). By discussing these negative scriptures and events, Pinker seeks to break any association between religion and morality—and thereby emphasize the benefits of humanist thinking, which doesn’t require belief in a deity to help others.

Next, the author attacks “faitheism,” or nonreligious people’s defense of faith, which argues that religion is natural or instinctive and encourages community and altruism. Pinker acknowledges that some faith-based movements and organizations have provided helpful services like education, charity, and medical care and that we can celebrate these actions. However, secular societies can provide such services too and have done so at greater rates than religious organizations or societies. If religions deserve praise for sometimes supporting humanism, “they should not be shielded from criticism when they obstruct those ends” (432) by limiting science education or suppressing stem cell research or HPV vaccinations. Pinker emphasizes that religious followers don’t necessarily embody their religion’s stated foundations, such as Christianity’s humility, forgiveness, and compassion. Pinker’s claim that 80% of white evangelical Christians voted for Trump underscores this contradiction.

Pinker rejects the notion that only religion can offer meaningful explanations for life, calling religious answers to existential questions “shallow and archaic” (433).

Similarly, he criticizes “spirituality” that looks for meaning in coincidences and claims that the events of the universe are personal and derive from a kind of divine order. According to Pinker, the fact that the laws of the universe don’t care about individuals doesn’t make life “meaningless” since their family, friends, and community care about them—and people with “humanistic sensibilities” can extend basic care to any sentient being, making life more meaningful. In addition, Pinker notes that people aren’t re-embracing religion; in many countries, atheists outnumber religious people, and faith is declining in Eastern Europe. Long-term studies have shown that nations such as Canada, Australia, and New Zealand have become less religious over the generations. Even in the US, a more religious developed nation, rates of religious adherence are declining. Pinker explains an interesting connection between religious adherence and politics: Religious people are more likely to vote than secular people. Pinker attributes this to the organized nature of religion and the persuasive power it uses to direct people’s behavior. The author cites several reasons to explain the overall decline of religion, including an increase in affluence and better education. He emphasizes the inverse correlation between religious adherence and standard of living: Irreligious countries tend to have a high standard of living, while highly religious countries tend to have a lower standard of living. As in previous passages, Pinker contrasts reason with religion and urges consideration of the connections between rationality and secularism.

Pinker notes that human flourishing isn’t progressing as quickly in Islamic nations as in the rest of the world. These nations tend to score lower on education, human rights, freedom, health, and happiness and more often go to war and implement cruel punishments for law violations. Pinker argues against attributing this reality entirely to the religion itself, and he points to Islamic societies’ historical contributions to science and cosmopolitanism. However, some who practice “regressive customs” like female genital mutilation wrongly label them as part of Islamic law. Furthermore, violent intervention from Western countries in the Ottoman empire, the support of mujahideen in Afghanistan, and the invasion of Iraq have worsened the situation.

Nevertheless, Pinker insists that some of these regions’ issues are traceable to problems inherent in religious belief. He claims that the Quran encourages anti-humanist practices: It contains literal instructions to administer the death penalty for religious crimes like alcohol consumption, adultery, and gay sexual orientation. Furthermore, the scriptures preach sexual servitude and crucifixion for non-believers, similar to some of the Bible’s anti-humanist teachings. Pinker claims that debating which scriptures are worse is irrelevant; “what matters is how literally the adherents take them” (440). He laments that the “benign hypocrisy” that caused Jews and Christians to reject the more violent aspects of their scriptures isn’t as common in the Islamic world. In addition, more than 80% of surveyed Muslims consider themselves strongly religious, and over half believe that only one correct way exists to interpret the Quran: to interpret and follow it literally. Pinker connects this religiosity—and the commitment to literal interpretations—with anti-humanist behavior and argues that these trends were once true of Christianity until the Enlightenment shifted people’s perspectives and changed their scripture interpretations.

In the West, some non-Muslims have become “strange apologists” for oppression in Islamic countries to prevent prejudice and hatred against Muslim people and resist a “destructive” narrative about the clash of civilizations. However, Pinker insists that identifying the anti-humanist beliefs or practices in Islam isn’t “Islamophobic” and points out that the “overwhelming majority of victims of Islamic violence and repression are other Muslims” (441). Pinker refers to a long list of Muslim intellectuals who are advocating for humanist reforms in Islamic countries, encouraging optimism that these nations can enjoy their own Enlightenment and the human flourishing that should follow it. This nuanced account of Islamic societies balances Pinker’s respect for humanistic strains of Islamic culture with confronting anti-Enlightenment movements in the Islamic world. By referring to the dozens of Muslim intellectuals advocating for humanist reform, Pinker avoids generalizations about Muslims and ends the discussion on an uplifting note.

Pinker next focuses on another enemy of humanism: romantic heroism. He claims that Nietzsche articulated the concept in his philosophy, which celebrates a “superman” who finds “heroic glory” through power in which good and evil are irrelevant. Pinker includes various quotations in which Nietzsche advocates for violence against anyone “degenerate and parasitical” (445) and condemns humanism. Pinker blames these philosophies for inspiring the world wars and Nazism, and he laments that Nietzsche continues to garner admiration. Many artists found his beliefs appealing because they elevated the artist, alongside the warrior, as admirable. Pinker accuses some intellectuals of using Nietzche’s beliefs to excuse various dictators’ atrocities and romanticize their leadership. Bringing his analysis to the present day, Pinker claims that Nietzsche influenced Trump advisors Stephen Bannon and Michael Anton, who endorse views that cosmopolitanism and multiculturalism threaten national identity and greatness, recoiling at the idea of modernity and instead idealizing the past. These ideas manifested in Trump’s rejection of immigration and unwillingness to cooperate on global climate agreements. By condemning politicians and advisors by name, Pinker gives his work an assertive tone and helps clarify what he considers modern manifestations of anti-Enlightenment thinking.

Pinker refutes the notion that ethnic nationalism is somehow natural, calling it “bad evolutionary psychology” (450). Throughout most of history, nation-states were nonexistent, and while people are vulnerable to tribalism, what we see as a tribe varies widely. Furthermore, the notion that “ethnic uniformity” somehow produces “cultural excellence” is erroneous; Pinker argues that the most vibrant cultures have been trade cities where many different kinds of people crossed paths and exchanged goods and ideas (450). He’s hopeful that our own culture will continue to become more cosmopolitan: “The advantages of cosmopolitanism and international cooperation cannot be denied for long in a world in which the flow of people and ideas is unstoppable” (451). By contrasting the closed minds of tribal thinkers with the more open-minded people interested in new ideas and willing to compromise, Pinker visualizes an “unstoppable” wave of progress in our interconnected world. This claim helps create a sense of hope for the future.

Pinker concludes his work by imploring journalists, intellectuals, and others not to cave to pessimism and other counter-Enlightenment thinking: “Don’t confuse pessimism with profundity: problems are inevitable, but problems are solvable, and diagnosing every setback as a symptom of a sick society is a cheap grab for gravitas” (452). Enlightenment thinking belongs to all of humanity because anyone can agree that life, health, abundance, freedom, happiness, and knowledge are worthwhile goals for all societies.