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Joseph McCarthyA modern alternative to SparkNotes and CliffsNotes, SuperSummary offers high-quality Study Guides with detailed chapter summaries and analysis of major themes, characters, and more.
Though McCarthy’s “Enemies from Within” is often credited with inaugurating the political movement that bears his name, the second Red Scare was already underway before he made the speech. Red-baiting in politics was not uncommon in the post-war years. Accusing a political opponent of being insufficiently anti-Communist was a frequent tactic used by conservative politicians, and even Harry Truman, a Democrat, used the ploy against his progressive rival Henry Wallace. There was an anti-Communist fervor in American life before the United States entered the Second Cold War, as evidenced in the 1938 formation of the House Committee on Un-American Activities, which primarily investigated alleged Communist activity.
Several months before the end of the war, US President Franklin D. Roosevelt, UK Prime Minister Winston Churchill, and Soviet Premier Joseph Stalin met at the Yalta Conference to discuss the reorganization of Europe in the war’s aftermath. The agreements initially seemed favorable to the United States. Stalin agreed to break the Soviet-Japanese Neutrality Pact and enter the war on the side of the Allies in the Pacific, although it is worth noting that the Soviet Union only declared war on Japan after the atom bombs were dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Stalin also agreed to maintain peaceful relations with neighboring European countries, but when the war ended, he broke the agreement by invading and occupying much of Eastern Europe.
Such unforeseen outcomes of the Yalta Conference contributed to growing apprehension regarding the threat from the Soviet Union and Communism in general. In response to Soviet aggression and to address the complicated geopolitical situation, President Truman delivered what would become known as the Truman Doctrine speech before the joint session of Congress in 1947. Truman established the commitment of both military and economic assistance to democratic countries shattered by the war and to those under threat from authoritarian forces. The Economic Recovery Act of 1948 involved a military component as well, laying the foundations for what would become the new national security state. These policy initiatives constituted a shift from isolationism to a robust foreign interventionism, and changes such as these would require the consent of Congress and from the nation. In the Truman Doctrine speech, the president portrayed the world in stark, morally absolutist terms as a conflict between democracy and totalitarian domination, and the public was receptive to this new Cold War framework. Anxieties in the postwar years were directed toward the red menace. But there was also increasing concern that the Communist threat had permeated even the branches of government. Other programs, such as Truman’s executive order the Federal Employee Loyalty Program of 1947, seemed to substantiate the trepidation about possible subversive activities taking place within an official capacity.
In 1948, the State Department official Alger Hiss was accused of passing classified documents to the Soviet Union. That he was also a member of the delegation sent to Yalta aroused further suspicion of Communist infiltration. In August of 1949, the Soviet Union successfully detonated an atom bomb. This was psychologically jarring for Americans, who had derived a sense of security from the US monopoly on nuclear weapons. A few months later, Chiang Kai-shek was driven out of China by the Communist armies of Mao Zedong, and the People’s Republic of China was established. A month before McCarthy’s “Enemies from Within” speech, British intelligence had arrested German physicist Klaus Fuchs for passing information on the Manhattan Project to the Soviet Union. All these troubling events meant that when McCarthy gave his speech to the Republican Women’s Club in Wheeling, casting the world as a stark conflict between democracy and autocracy, his audience was both ideologically and emotionally receptive.
The socio-political landscape of the mid-century Cold War was a fertile ground for the appearance of an American demagogue, and Joseph McCarthy was a demagogue par excellence. His rise in the movement that would eventually bear his name was not entirely the result of opportunism, although shameless opportunism is considered an attribute of the demagogue. The primary vehicle of the demagogue is rhetorical force, and the potency of the locution is not dependent on statements of fact but on emotive content. Demagogues often depict their audience as a righteous people threatened by a powerful and malevolent enemy. McCarthy frames the Cold War in terms of a bipolar conflict between atheistic Communism and Democratic Christianity, a framing calculated to provoke an emotional response in his audience. The threat of Communism and, more specifically, the likelihood that Communists have become embedded in US institutions is portrayed in distorted, hyperbolic terms that meant not to inform but instead to instill fear. Once the ideological framework has become accepted, this audience can be persuaded to blame Communist subversion for all economic difficulty and political uncertainty.
Part of McCarthy’s effectiveness as a demagogue is that he didn’t confine himself to emotional appeals: He presented copious amounts of data, which gave his accusations the appearance of validity. He didn’t just tell his audience that there were Communists in the State Department. He raised a fistful of papers in the air and solemnly declared, “I have here in my hand a list of 205” (830). It was the specificity of the exact number and the concrete evidence of the pieces of paper clutched in his hand that gave the political theater a veneer of authenticity. The fact that he didn’t really have any names, and that even the number of Communists claimed by McCarthy kept changing, did little to detract from the strength of his message. The careless assembly of evidence is another tactic attributed to the demagogue. The names McCarthy collected for the Wheeling speech were drawn from previous Republican investigations, newspaper articles, and statements from the congressional record. The reference to Alger Hiss was effective in terms of name recognition, but his perjury trial was already settled. Regardless, none of the names McCarthy produced resulted in persecutions. McCarthy enlisted his friend FBI director J. Edgar Hoover to look into his lists of names to see if they could find any evidence of subversive activities, but they found none. Hoover was troubled by the fact that McCarthy was so specific with the numbers he cited, especially when he lacked evidence. But it was this very specificity that made McCarthy such an effective demagogue.