48 pages • 1 hour read
Marc ReisnerA modern alternative to SparkNotes and CliffsNotes, SuperSummary offers high-quality Study Guides with detailed chapter summaries and analysis of major themes, characters, and more.
The focus of Chapter 11 is on dams that the Bureau built or desired to build in recent decades on sites that had known geologic problems, but the agency still built them since there were few “good places [left] to erect its dams” (379). Due to the Reclamation Act amendments, there was still demand for dams; however, the Bureau only had sites left that it had rejected years earlier. The agency rationalized these construction projects by claiming technological advances were making them possible. Reisner emphasizes how unlikely this was since the Bureau was “building dams on rotten foundation rock, between spongy sandstone abutments, in slide-prone canyons, and close to active earthquake faults” (383).
The first example is Fontenelle Dam, located on the Green River in southwestern Wyoming, which the Bureau built in the 1960s. It sprang a leak in 1965, but engineers were able to save it. The dam’s construction was economically senseless. However, it was politically a rewarding decision since locals wanted the dam.
The second example is Teton Dam, built on the Teton River in Idaho, which experienced catastrophic failure. Since the 1920s, there were discussions about building a dam in this location, but there were two drawbacks to the site: geology and the farmland’s copious water requirements. An environmental impact statement, now required by law, did not raise the possibility of collapse. Several environmental and conservation groups filed a lawsuit to stop the dam’s construction, but it was not successful. Less than a year after completion, the dam collapsed, causing “the second-largest flood in North America since the last Ice Age” (403). Eleven people died, damage estimates were $2 billion, and thousands of acres of agricultural land were unusable. Despite the devastation, there are still voices calling for the dam’s rebuilding.
The Bureau did not learn from either Fontenelle or Teton Dams. It turned its sights to the Narrows Dam Project on the South Platte River in Colorado. The bedrock in this area was akin to a coffee filter. Even the state engineer said it was conceivable that the dam might collapse and that it could not hold as much water as the Bureau claimed, but the Bureau ignored all of this. It sought to build a dam that, while flooding a bunch of small farmers, would provide water to less than 250,000 acres of farmland owned by bigger farmers. The environmental impact would also be severe, further endangering waterfowl habitats and increasing pollution in the river. In the end the farmers who were supposed to be the project’s beneficiaries did not want the water. The Narrows project refuses to die, and the federal government has considered reviving the project several times.
The concluding chapter of Cadillac Desert provides vivid examples that illustrate how truly precarious the West’s water crisis is. The first example is the Ogallala Aquifer, extending from South Dakota to Texas. Overnight, West Texas, one of the poorest farming regions in the United States, transformed into one of the wealthiest due to groundwater from this aquifer. This region now raises nearly half of beef cattle in the country. Due to overdraft, water from the aquifer will run out in decades when it should have lasted hundreds of years. Reisner reinforces that West Texas, and other areas that depend on the aquifer, chose immediate gain over long-term economic stability. Water importation projects have been of interest to West Texas, but the costs would be astronomic. Despite this, it is hard for individuals to give up on this idea. Reisner notes, “such is our reluctance to let nature regain control, to suffer the fate of nearly all the irrigated civilizations of antiquity” (454).
Civilizations dependent on irrigation all have one thing in common: Salt was their demise. In recent years, concentrations of salt have increased drastically in some of the world’s rivers and most productive agricultural land. Canals and aqueducts divert rivers and spread water over farmland. As water percolates through the soil and returns to the river, it passes through thick deposits of mineral salt. This phenomenon is common in the West. This process coupled with high rates of evaporation seen at the man-made lakes (e.g., Lake Powell) and dams (e.g., Glen Canyon Dam), which leaves salt behind, substantially increases the salinity of the rivers. Water that has high salinity spells death for most crops. There is now more land going out of production from high salinity than new irrigated fields coming into production. Desalinization plants are being built, but these are extremely expensive.
The final vulnerability Reisner discusses is silt. While engineers have safeguarded dams from floods, earthquakes, and landslides, they have not found a cure for silt. As silt increases, it reduces dams’ water capacity. The dams in the West are all silting up. Desilting dams is incredibly expensive. For example, estimates for desilting Lake Mead are $29 million. The blame lies with humans who tried to control rivers to make a home where they should not have.
The Epilogue recapitulates many of the central themes of the book. To Reisner, it is hard for people to think about the vulnerable aspects of the American West’s desert civilization since they remain an abstraction. However, groundwater mining, salt poisoning of the soil and waters, and silting are real threats. The threat of disintegration of the desert civilization lies in the federally funded dam construction projects, because without these projects there never would have been a desert civilization. By offering cheap water, the Bureau created a monster that it cannot fix. Subsidies are at the root of many of these issues. Water is still so cheap that there are no incentives for Western farmers to conserve. Taxpayers continue to subsidize some of the most productive farmland in the world, which generates more revenue than actual crop production. The Bureau originally set out to help small farmers. In the end, however, it made rich farmers wealthier, at the expense of these small farmers.
The West must now try new solutions to solve its water crisis, such as cities buying surplus water from farmers and regulation of groundwater pumping. These are things the region should have tried decades ago. However, despite everything we have learned over the last 150 years, there are still some who see water importation as the only way to save the West, even if this is just for a few hundred years more. The North American Water and Power Alliance (NAWAPA), in theory, would pump water from British Columbia to the American West. Unsurprisingly, an engineer for the Los Angeles water department was the project’s mastermind. The environmental consequences would be immense, including the damming of major rivers in Canada, the drowning of tens of millions of acres of wilderness and wildlife habitat in both countries, and relocating hundreds of thousands of people. Despite the astronomical economic and environmental costs, there are still some who prefer this plan over conservation in the American West.
In his concluding chapters, Reisner suggests that humanity has learned nothing from the last 150 years of water projects. People in the West still demand dams, even though there are no longer any good dam sites left. One of the most astounding examples of this compulsion followed the catastrophic failure of Teton Dam. The dam collapsed due to underlying geological problems, yet “there are a lot of voices in Idaho calling for the dam to be rebuilt” (409). Six months after the disaster, the Idaho Water Users’ Association issued a resolution that called for another dam, although this one was to be safe, built at or near the same site. This story is not unique to Idaho but occurs across the Western region.
Reisner also reminds the reader of the futility of seeking to control nature. So much land that cost a fortune to bring into production will die in the coming years due to high salinity. Farmers being “sold dirt cheap water” (481), which they flooded their fields with, helps explain this salt problem. The Bureau, despite the precariousness of the situation, continues to sell cheap water to famers. Thus, there are no incentives for farmers in this region to conserve. Unregulated groundwater mining will result in aquifers from the last Ice Age going out of existence. Water from these sources should have lasted centuries but instead will have lasted decades.
While the water has turned poor farming regions into some of the wealthiest, one must wonder what will happen when the water runs out. Dams, the pride and joy of the Bureau, are silting up. It will cost substantial money to desilt these installments; money the United States no longer has. These issues paint a grim picture for the West’s future if practices continue to follow the status quo. Based on Reisner’s concluding example of NAWAPA, we should expect to see worsening consequences of our attempts to control nature as time goes on.