56 pages • 1 hour read
David HumeA Treatise of Human Nature
Nonfiction | Book | Adult | Published in 1739A modern alternative to SparkNotes and CliffsNotes, SuperSummary offers high-quality Study Guides with detailed chapter summaries and analysis of major themes, characters, and more.
Book 3, Part 1Chapter Summaries & Analyses
Book 3, Part 1 Summary
For the third and final book in A Treatise of Human Nature, Hume discusses morals. He opposes the argument that virtue is a “conformity to reason” (508). Since reason is just a tool for determining what is true or false and is not a standard of truth or virtue in and of itself, it cannot prove whether or not an action is good or evil (510). Reason can only prove if a judgment behind an action was mistaken or factual, and we do not judge the morality of an action over whether or not the action was based on a correct or mistaken judgment.
Hume also argues more broadly against rationalism, reiterating his argument throughout A Treatise of Human Nature that we gain knowledge not through abstract reasoning, but by comparing ideas and gathering evidence through our senses. This also applies to morals. Patricide and incest are considered immoral, but it is not just because of reason. After all, animals are not capable of the same abstract reasoning as humans, but they too are capable of moral actions (519-20). Hume concludes with the observation that moral rules always seem to be written with “ought” and “ought not”, instead of “is” and “is not.” For Hume, this suggests that moral guidelines cannot be expressed with simple, rational statements (521).
Hume asserts that moral judgments do not come from just reason or a comparison of ideas, but “by means of some impression or sentiment” (522). In other words, morality inspires in us a certain reaction rooted in pleasure or discomfort. Hume believes morality causes a distinct kind of pleasurable or uncomfortable feeling in us, much like the indirect passions such as love. Next, he speculates on the origins of our moral feelings. He rejects the traditional view that virtue is “natural” and vice is “unnatural.” Instead, Hume counters that both virtue and vice could be equally natural or just as much an “unnatural” product of society (526-27).
Book 3, Part 1 Analysis
For Book 3, Hume transitions from discussing emotions to a consideration of morality. For Hume, morality is deeply connected to emotions and to pain and pleasure. True to Hume’s stance on Empiricism Versus Rationalism, Hume rejects the view that morality is based on reason. Hume goes so far as to claim that it is “impossible, that the distinction betwixt moral good and evil, can be made to reason” (514). After all, reason might tell us to listen to our self-interest and not help a sick relative to minimize our chances of getting infected. Instead, morality or, to use Hume’s own vocabulary, vice and virtue are ultimately based on our experiences of pleasure and pain. We do acts of charity because they give us a type of pleasure, while we are discomforted by the cruel actions of a criminal who is never caught.
Further, just as with Hume’s arguments over The Passions and Reason, Hume suggests that the passions are not in conflict with morality. In fact, Hume compares the feelings that seeing or experiencing justice or injustice inspire in us to the passions (522-23). For example, in recent years scientific studies have found that even monkeys and dogs will react if they feel that they or a companion have been unfairly denied a treat. This is not just a matter of self-interest, however. We ourselves feel a certain type of discomfort if a classmate is unfairly given a lower grade than they deserved or if a co-worker does not get the praise they deserved. This is the special type of pain that Hume is attempting to describe.
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